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Preface 
 
It has been 61 years since Hugh Everett III’s PhD dissertation, On the 
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, was submitted to the Princeton University Physics 
Department.  After more than a decade of relative obscurity it was resurrected by Bryce 
DeWitt as The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and since then has 
become an active topic of discussion, reinterpretation, and modification, especially 
among philosophers of science, quantum cosmologists, and advocates of quantum 
decoherence and quantum computing.  Many of these analyses are quite sophisticated and 
considered to be important contributions to physics and philosophy.  I am primarily an 
experimental physicist and my pragmatic ruminations on the subject might be viewed 
with some suspicion.  Indeed, Bohr’s pragmatic Copenhagen Interpretation is often 
disparaged by this same cohort.  Still, I think that my experimentalist’s vantage point has 
something to offer and I here offer it to you. I gratefully acknowledge the inspiration I 
have drawn from Freeman Dyson and Marcel Reginatto; although, of course, they 
deserve no blame whatsoever for any foolish proclamations I might have made. 
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   2	  
1.  IN THE BEGINNING …. 
 
 I was beginning my second year of graduate school when Bryce DeWitt’s article 
(DeWitt 1970), “Quantum mechanics and reality”, appeared in Physics Today.  I had 
already begun to fret about the interpretation of quantum mechanics and so I read 
DeWitt’s piece with great interest.  Two things about quantum mechanics had bothered 
me most.  I worried a great deal about the fundamental statistical aspect of the theory.  
The deterministic Schrodinger  equation governed the evolution of the wave function 
(probability amplitude) but as far as I could discern, quantum theory proper was silent on 
the outcome of any particular measurement; according to quantum mechanics, nothing 
ever “happens”.  This worry was supposed to be allayed by Bohr’s Copenhagen 
Interpretation that instructs us to interpret the quantum state in terms of the probability 
with which a classical apparatus yields a specific measurement result.  While possibly 
resolving my first conundrum, it immediately raised three related issues:  why is it 
necessary to revert to classical physics; when and where does this classical measurement 
occur, i.e., where is the quantum/classical divide; and how does one describe the physical 
interaction across the divide.  Of course, these are questions that had vexed physicists and 
philosophers since the beginning of quantum mechanics but I undoubtedly thought that I 
had conjured them myself.  It’s interesting that the notion of state reduction (collapse of 
the wave function) wasn’t on my list of puzzlements. (It was certainly foremost on 
Everett’s mind.)  Perhaps, this is because none of my introductory quantum texts 
mentioned it.  In addition, as an experimentalist, I always considered the measurement to 
be the end of the process.  If one wanted to continue after that, then a new experiment had 
to be effected.  I’ll return to this topic in Section 6. 
 DeWitt’s solution, for which he credits Everett, was that quantum theory 
describes everything including the experimental apparatus and even the scientist who 
performs the experiment.  In addition, the wave function never collapses but rather a 
measurement (or any interaction for that matter) initiates a branching of the universe so 
that all the statistically possible results of any measurement occur in one of the branches.  
According to DeWitt (1970),  
This universe is constantly splitting into a stupendous number of branches, 
all resulting from measurement-like interactions between its myriad of 
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components.  Moreover, every quantum transition taking place on every 
star, in every galaxy, in every corner of the universe is splitting our local 
world on earth into myriads of copies of itself.   
 
This was DeWitt’s many worlds interpretation, although he didn’t use that term at the 
time.  He and Neill Graham edited a volume, The Many Worlds Interpretation of 
Quantum Mechanics (DeWitt and Graham 1973), which consisted of reprints of papers 
by Everett, DeWitt, Graham, and others.  To be sure, Everett did not describe his 
interpretation in terms of branching worlds.  Finally, a still disputed claim of Everett’s 
and DeWitt’s was that the probabilistic predictions of standard quantum theory arose 
naturally from the formalism with no necessity of postulating a statistical interpretation 
(i.e., the Born rule).  Rather, “The mathematical formalism of the quantum theory is 
capable of yielding its own interpretation” (DeWitt 1970).  The latter claim involves 
disputable mathematical and philosophical analyses that I won’t address in this paper. 
 The notion of a myriad of branching universes certainly resolved my contention 
that  “according to quantum mechanics, nothing ever happens” by claiming that 
“everything happens.”  On the other hand, at least for me, it did nothing to alleviate my 
worry about when and where the quantum/classical transition occurs.  That problem was 
just replaced by the question of when and where the universe branches.  The many worlds 
interpretation was mute on that point.  Again, the branching universe concept was 
DeWitt’s, not Everett’s, and I’ll return to this issue later. 
 In a nutshell, this was what I gleaned from DeWitt’s Physics Today article.  In the 
intervening years, hundreds of papers have analyzed and expanded upon Everett’s thesis.  
While I’ve read some of these and will briefly mention a few in the following pages, my 
present essay is not intended to be a historical critique of the many worlds interpretation.  
The reason is that most of these studies are theoretical/philosophical in nature and 
invariably become involved in the ontology of quantum theory.  My pragmatic, 
experimentalist’s view is more epistemic and consequently I have little interest in 
pondering the nature of quantum reality.  In the next section I’ll present a simple toy 
model that captures the essence of what I believe was Everett’s theory and in the 
following sections I’ll address questions I have about such a model.   
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 Before moving on, I should mention one other paper from my graduate student 
days that would eventually have a profound effect on my understanding of the 
foundations of quantum theory.  In 1972, Henry Stapp authored a paper entitled “The 
Copenhagen Interpretation”.  To be sure, Stapp’s motivation was not to express his own 
interpretation of quantum mechanics but to present, as accurately as possible, Niels 
Bohr’s interpretation;2 however, Stapp’s own S-matrix interpretation of quantum 
mechanics accepts most of the pragmatic features of the Copenhagen interpretation 
(Stapp 1971).  The views expressed in Stapp’s paper will figure strongly in my pragmatic 
criticisms of the many worlds interpretation. 
 
2.  THE WAVE FUNCTION OF THE UNIVERSE 
 
 In January 1956 Everett submitted a long version of his thesis, Wave Mechanics 
Without Probability, to his advisor John Wheeler.  It was later included in DeWitt’s book 
(DeWitt and Graham 1973) under the title, The Theory of the Universal Wave Function.  
Wheeler carried of a version of this document to Copenhagen in order to discuss it with 
his good friend Neils Bohr and coworkers.  It was not well received.  Whether or not this 
situation led Wheeler to pressure Everett to significantly revise his thesis, in March 1957 
Everett submitted a much shorter doctoral dissertation (about ¼ the length of the original) 
under the title, On the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics.  This version was published 
in the July 1957 issue of Reviews of Modern Physics under the title “Relative State” 
Formulation of Quantum Mechanics and was accompanied by a two page paper by 
Wheeler (1957) assessing Everett’s paper.3  I’ll come back to the importance of the 
notion of the relative state in Section 3 but in this section will concentrate on the notion 
of a universal wave function. 
 The very first sentence of the long version of Everett’s thesis was: “We begin, as 
a way of entering our subject, by characterizing a particular interpretation of quantum 
theory which … is the most common form encountered in textbooks and university 
lectures on the subject.”  Referencing von Neumann (1955), he immediately identifies the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  To	  this	  end	  Stapp	  corresponded	  with	  Werner	  Heisenberg	  and	  Léon	  Rosenfeld.	  	  Those	  
correspondences	  are	  included	  in	  an	  appendix	  to	  his	  paper.	  	  I	  heartily	  recommend	  it.	  3	  For	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  the	  history	  surrounding	  these	  events	  see	  the	  paper	  by	  Osnaghi	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  and	  the	  book	  by	  Byrne	  (2010).	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interpretation as postulating a state function description of a system and then specifies 
two modes of state evolution: 1) the (nonlinear) discontinuous change to an eigenstate of 
some operator, the collapse of the wave function, and 2) the unitary evolution of the state 
function (e.g., via Schrodinger’s equation). He then points out paradoxes (of the 
Schrodinger’s cat genre) associated with this exegesis.  Recall	  that	  wave	  function	  collapse	  was	  not	  one	  of	  my	  problems	  with quantum mechanics.  Nor was it a 
component of the Copenhagen interpretation.  Everett acknowledged this but then 
dismissed Bohr’s interpretation with:  
While undoubtedly safe from contradiction, due to its extreme  
conservatism, it is perhaps overcautious. We do not believe that  
the primary purpose of theoretical physics is to construct ‘safe’  
theories at severe cost in the applicability of their concepts, which  
is a sterile occupation, but to make useful models which serve for  
a time and are replaced as they are outworn.   
One can imagine that such a characterization of Bohr’s perspective might have vexed 
Wheeler. 
 Everett’s way out of the conundrum was to include the measuring apparatus (and 
observer for that matter) in the state function of the entire system, which then evolves 
only according to the unitary prescription, i.e., there is no collapse of the wave function.  
He then proclaims that  
Since the universal validity of the state function description is asserted,  
one can regard the state functions themselves as the fundamental entities, 
and one can even consider the state function of the whole universe. In 
this sense this theory can be called the theory of the "universal wave 
function,” since all of physics is presumed to follow from this function  
alone.  
In this single step, Everett rids us of the paradox of wave function collapse and of any 
problems associated with the inclusion of classical physics in the measurement process.  
After all, the observer is now part of the quantum state function.  Everett then notes: 
“There remains, however, the question whether or not such a theory can be put into 
correspondence with our experience.”  Most of the remainder of his thesis is devoted to 
answering this question by invoking the “relative state” concept.  I’ll return to this in the 
next section. 
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 Before addressing the concept of the wave function of the (entire) universe using 
a toy model, let me say a few words about the connection of Everett’s theory with general 
relativity and cosmology.  Because general relativity is theory of all of space and time, 
there is no way for an external observer to view it from the outside as is often ascribed to 
the Copenhagen interpretation.  Therefore, a theory that includes the observer in the 
formal description of a system might seem like a natural fit with general relativity.  In the 
long version of his thesis, Everett seemed unaware of such a connection or at least he 
made no mention of it.  However his advisor, John Wheeler, certainly was, which helps 
explain why he took such interest in Everett’s idea.  As Wheeler concluded in the very 
last sentence of his 1957 commentary on Everett’s thesis,  
 Apart from Everett’s concept of relative states, no self-consistent system  
 of ideas is at hand to explain what one shall mean by quantizing a closed  
system like the universe of general relativity. 
Presumably as a consequence of Wheeler’s influence, the very first sentence of Everett’s 
1957 paper (the subsequent short version of his thesis) was 
The task of quantizing general relativity raises serious questions about the 
meaning of the present formulation and interpretation of quantum mechanics 
when applied to so fundamental a structure as the space-time geometry itself.  
At the end of the paper he concluded that “The ‘relative state’ formulation…may 
therefore prove a fruitful framework for the quantization of general relativity.”  It appears 
that Everett got Wheeler’s message loud and clear.  More recently, many others have 
been attracted to Everett’s work precisely because of this quantum mechanics-general 
relativity-cosmology connection.  Several examples can be found in Deutsch (1985), 
Tipler (1986), Gell-Man & Hartle (1989), Page (1999), Aguirre & Tegmark (2011), 
Bousso & Suskind (2012), and Linde (2016).  
Now to my toy universal wave function:  Just what does one mean by a universal 
wave function and what does this have to do with DeWitt’s many worlds?  Well, such a 
wave function surely constitutes a quantum description of at least the 10!" particles that 
we know inhabit the observable universe.  Such a wave function resides in a 3  ×10!" 
dimensional configuration space.  Each point in such a space would represent the location 
of all the particles in the universe, i.e., a possible configuration of the universe.  Because 
this wave function never collapses, one is prohibited from ascribing reality to only one 
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such point, i.e., there are a plethora of universes. Furthermore, since there are an infinite 
number of points in configuration space, there must be an infinite number of universes.  
If instead of a wave function in configuration space we use the equivalent description of 
vectors in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, the same conclusion is reached.  As 
DeWitt (1971) pointed out, this isn’t quite right.  Because of the uncertainty principle, not 
all of these universes are distinguishable.  So how many of them are there?  Consider the 
following back-of-the-envelope estimate. 
 Each of the 10!" particles can be located anywhere in the (observable) universe, 
which has a volume of approximately 10!"𝑚!.  As a smallest volume in which a particle 
might be localized, let’s pick the Planck volume, 4×10!!"#𝑚!.  Surely particles cannot 
possibly be located more precisely than this.  (You’ll see in a moment that it hardly 
matters what smallest volume one chooses.)  Thus there are about 10!"# possible 
locations in the universe for each of the 10!" particles.  If 𝑛 = 10!"# and 𝑚 = 10!", then 
the total number of possible universes is 𝑁 = 𝑛!.  Because quantum particles are 
identical one must divide by the number of configurations of 𝑚 particles, i.e., 𝑚!.  By 
Stirling’s approximation 𝑚!~ 𝑚 𝑒 ! to within a factor on the order of unity. Thus  𝑁~ !"! ! = 10!"!".!.  (Never did I imagine I would ever encounter a number in the 
googolplex range!)4  One might worry that I didn’t take into account that fermions 
assiduously avoid each other; however, there are so many of these cells in the universe 
that there is little chance that more than one particle would occupy the same Planck 
volume.  Also, in this notation, there is little dependence on the cell size.  For example, if 
we divided up the observable universe into cubic centimeters (1cc ~10!" Planck 
volumes), we have 𝑁~10!"!".!.  A plethora of universes, indeed! 
 So now we know roughly how many universes the universal wave function 
describes but just what is this universal wave function?  It’s hard to wrap your mind 
around a wave function that describes absolutely everything in the universe, including a 
person like you in the process of trying to wrap their mind around a universal wave 
function.  It’s difficult to imagine expressing such a wave function mathematically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  astute	  reader	  will	  have	  noticed	  that	  I	  considered	   𝑚 = 10!"	  to	  be	  of	  the	  order	  unity!	  	  Now	  you	  can	  see	  why.	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because that expression must also contain a description of us writing down that 
expression. (David Deutsch (1997) might claim that quantum computers could 
accomplish this).  Also, how do we interpret the amplitude of the wave function?  Is it a 
probability amplitude?  It can’t indicate the probability of a given universe existing 
because we assume that all of the universes described by the wave function exist (in some 
sense).  Everett’s answer is that the universal wave function is meaningful but only in a 
“relative” sense as discussed in the next section. 
Another problem is how are we ever to identify universes like ours with people 
like us in the nearly googolplex of universes included in the universal wave function. 
This is often referred to as the problem of identifying a preferred basis in Hilbert space.  
Clearly most of the universes will be chaotic and bear no resemblance to the one in which 
we live but there will still be very many with nearly identical copies of ourselves. A great 
deal has been written about how one might identify such bases or equivalently how 
universes such as ours naturally emerge.  I’ll briefly discuss this issue in Section 5. 
Everett, for his part, didn’t worry about the problem and maintained that all components 
of all bases are “actual” universes in the same sense. He even supposed that occasionally 
different universes could interact with one another.  Deutsch (1997) maintains that the 
phenomenon of quantum interference is evidence of precisely this sort of interaction. 
Let us now turn to the evolution of these many worlds.  I’ll assume that the wave 
function in configuration space evolves according to the Schrodinger equation (ignoring 
the cosmological evolution of the universe).  The Schrodinger equation is deterministic 
so the universal wave function is determined in both space and time, subject only to 
initial conditions.  So we might consider an expanded notion of many worlds that consists 
of all possible universes at all possible times.  This doesn’t enlarge things much.  
Suppose we only consider possible universes in some small discrete time steps.  Let’s go 
with the Planck time, ~10!!"𝑠, for surely nothing much happens on time scales shorter 
than this.  The current age of the universe is roughly 10!" Planck times so that the 
number of possible universes since the big bang is our above estimate times 10!". As 
before, in terms of our googolplex sized number, this factor is of the order of unity and so 
doesn’t increase the number of universes under consideration, relatively speaking. 
Finally let’s get to DeWitt’s branching universes.  How do they fit into our simple 
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picture?  They don’t.  At one time there are ~10!"!" possible universes and at a time Δ𝑡 
later there are the same set of universes (increased slightly because of the expansion of 
the universe).  Is it possible to connect any particular universe at one time step with 
another particular universe at the next time step?  From what I’ve said so far, I don’t 
think so but I also don’t see this as a problem with Everett’s model.  (In Section 5, we’ll 
see the claim that certain course grained histories can be traced through time.  Everett 
seemed comfortable with this notion.)  Assume that in the plethora of universes depicted 
by the universal wave function at a specific time, we can identify the Hilbert space vector 
(or vectors) that corresponds to our universe.  Then that vector not only describes us as 
we are now but all our memories and all of recorded history, including fossils, which we 
know and love.  In the next time step, there will be another googolplex of universes with 
histories of their own.  Certainly many of them will have precisely the properties 
expected for my perceived evolution through my particular universe but will any be 
inhabited by the same me that I am now?  The pragmatist in me would probably say 
“who cares”. 
Let me digress for a moment to share a childhood fear I developed at about the 
age of nine.  I became obsessed with the notion that when I fell asleep I would cease to 
exist and in the morning an entirely different person would awake, albeit a person with 
precisely my memories.  (I was also terribly frightened by the 1956 movie, The Invasion 
of the Body Snatchers, which may have had something to do with the former fear.5)  I 
would hope that I got over this fear by embracing the pragmatist’s “who cares” attitude 
but I probably just got tired of being afraid. 
If one cannot trace a path though time from one version of the universe to the 
next, then how is one to make sense of DeWitt’s branching universes?  Everett didn’t 
seem to think this was an important question.  In fact, he never made any reference to 
branching universes.  In his short thesis he did refer to “observer state branches”.  This 
brings us to the next topic, the relativity of states. 
 
3.  RELATIVE STATES 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  I	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  (older)	  reader	  as	  to	  whether	  that	  film	  was	  an	  allegory	  or	  satire	  of	  the	  fear	  of	  communism	  and	  associated	  McCarthyism	  that	  gripped	  the	  US	  in	  the	  1950’s.	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 After introducing the concept of the universal wave function, Everett declares in 
the long version of his thesis [italics are Everett’s] 
The present thesis is devoted to showing that this concept of a universal 
wave mechanics, together with the necessary correlation machinery 
for its interpretation, forms a logically self consistent description of a 
universe in which several observers are at work. 
What follows is a very formal and detailed analysis to establish the logical self-
consistency of his approach.  Perhaps the most important concept that Everett introduced 
in this process was the notion of a relative state, which appeared in the title of the 
published version of his shortened PhD thesis, “Relative State” Formulation of Quantum 
Mechanics.  In the long version of his thesis, Everett (1956) puts it like this: 
There does not, in general, exist anything like a single state for one 
subsystem of a composite system. That is, subsystems do not possess 
states independent of the states of the remainder of the system, so that 
the subsystem states are generally correlated. One can arbitrarily choose 
a state for one subsystem, and be led to the relative state for the other 
subsystem. Thus we are faced with a fundamental relativity of states, 
which is implied by the formalism of composite systems. It is meaningless 
to ask the absolute state of a subsystem - one can only ask the state  
relative to a given state of the remainder of the system. 
The analysis that precedes this conclusion is based on standard quantum 
mechanics as presented in von Neumann’s, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum 
Mechanics (1955), to which Everett liberally refers.  Although the analysis is extensive, 
as is required to establish “logical consistency”, the notion can be expressed quite simply.  
When an observer performs an experiment on an object, the observer part of the universal 
wave function becomes entangled with the object part of the wave function, an 
entanglement represented by a superposition of possible object-observer states.  Consider 
for example, the measurement of the z-component of the spin, 𝑆!, of a spin ½ particle 
with a Stern-Gerlach apparatus.  Then the 𝑆! = + !! part of the particle wave function 
becomes entangled with the part of the observer wave function that sees the particle as 
spin up and the 𝑆! = − !! part of the particle wave function becomes entangled with the 
part of the observer wave function that sees the particle as spin down.  If we now choose 
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to consider only the part of the wave function for which the observer sees the particle as 
spin up, then the “relative state” of the particle is the wave function corresponding to 𝑆! = + !!.  According to Everett, there is no absolute particle state in isolation of the 
observer but rather only the entangled superposition of both outcomes6.  Nevertheless, 
one can always specify the particle state that is relative to the state of an observer that 
sees a particular outcome. 
Nowhere in this analysis does one assume the wave function of the particle 
collapses to a particular spin eigenstate.  The evolution of the object-observer wave 
function is according to the unitary Schrodinger equation.   However, if we limit our 
discussion to a particular outcome observed by the experimenter, then the relative state of 
the particle is precisely the same as if the observation caused the wave function to 
collapse in the usual sense.  That is, Everett’s interpretation is completely consistent with 
the “textbook interpretation of quantum mechanics” (as characterized by Everett). 
So after the experiment has been performed and has determined that the particle is 
in a spin up state, what is Everett’s interpretation of the spin down part of the 
superposition?  According to Everett (1956) 
It is therefore improper to attribute any less validity or “reality” to 
any element of a superposition than any other element, due to this ever 
present possibility of obtaining interference effects between the elements. 
All elements of a superposition must be regarded as simultaneously 
existing. 
That is, one must not toss out the other terms in the superposition because, no matter how 
extraordinary difficult it might be, it is always possible in principle to design a 
subsequent experiment that is sensitive to the other terms.  It is in this sense that Everett 
considers all terms of the superposition equally “real”.  Everett only uses the term 
“branches” with regard to “trajectories” of observers.  He mentions this only once in the 
long version of his thesis but is more detailed in his “relative state” paper (Everett 1957): 
We thus arrive at the following picture: Throughout all of a sequence  
of observation processes there is only one physical system representing  
the observer, yet there is no single unique state of the observer (which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  may	  strike	  one	  as	  reminiscent	  of	  Bohr’s	  contention	  that	  a	  particular	  property	  of	  a	  quantum	  state	  cannot	  be	  specified	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  apparatus	  used	  to	  measure	  it.	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follows from the representations of interacting systems). Nevertheless,  
there is a representation in terms of a superposition, each element of which 
contains a definite observer state and a corresponding system state. Thus 
with each succeeding observation (or interaction), the observer state  
"branches" into a number of different states. Each branch represents a  
different outcome of the measurement and the corresponding eigenstate  
for the object-system state. All branches exist simultaneously in the  
superposition after any given sequence of observations. 
It is interesting that the very first time he mentions “branches” in his thesis he is referring 
not to the branching of the universe nor even to the branching of an observer but rather to 
the branching of observer states.  He clarified his position in a footnote on the same page: 
 In reply to a preprint of this article some correspondents have raised  
the question of the “transition from possible to actual”, arguing that  
in “reality” there is - as our experience testifies - no such splitting of  
observer states, so that only one branch can ever actually exist. Since  
this point may occur to other readers the following is offered in  
explanation.  The whole issue of the transition from “possible” to  
“actual” is taken care of in the theory in a very simple way—there is  
no such transition, nor is such a transition necessary for the theory 
to be in accord with our experience. From the viewpoint of the theory  
all elements of a superposition (all “branches”) are “actual”, none any  
more “real” than the rest.  It is unnecessary to suppose that all but  
one are somehow destroyed, since all the separate elements of a  
superposition obey the wave equation with complete indifference to  
the presence or absence (“actuality” or not) of any other elements.  
This total lack of effect of one branch on another also implies that  
no observer will ever be aware of any “splitting” process.7 
It’s a little hard to pin down what Everett means by “real”.  In the long version of his 
thesis, with regard to physically separated, entangled systems, he says  
 From the present viewpoint all elements of this superposition are 
equally “real”.  Only the observer state has changed, so as to become  
correlated with the state of the near system and hence naturally with  
that of the remote system also. The mouse does not affect the universe 
- only the mouse [observer] is affected. 
Perhaps the most straightforward statement about reality appears in an unpublished draft, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Given	  his	  previous	  statement	  of	  the	  “possible”	  interference	  of	  the	  different	  branches,	  this	  later	  statement	  should	  obviously	  be	  taken	  as	  “total	  lack	  of	  effect”	  under	  normal	  circumstances.	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“Probability and Wave Mechanics”, that he gave to Wheeler in late 1956 (Byrne 2010, p 
140): 
 The physical ‘reality’ is assumed to be the wave function of the whole  
universe itself.  By properly interpreting the internal correlations in this  
wave function it is possible to explain the appearance of the macroscopic  
world to us, as well as the apparent probabilistic aspects. 
Perhaps this is why Everett wasn’t willing to say more about the “reality” of the other 
branches.  For him, the universal wave function is the reality, that is, the only reality 
necessary so that the “theory can be put into correspondence with our experience.”  
DeWitt (1970) on the other hand was willing to consider each isolated branch as a 
separate, real universe. 
 For example, in his 1970 Physics Today paper, DeWitt described the Schrodinger’s cat experiment as follows:  
 The animal trapped in a room together with a Geiger counter 
and a hammer, which, upon discharge of the counter, smashes a 
flask of prussic acid. The counter contains a trace of radioactive 
material - just enough that in one hour there is a 50% chance one 
of the nuclei will decay and therefore an equal chance the cat will 
be poisoned. At the end of the hour the total wave function for the 
system will have a form in which the living cat and the dead cat are 
mixed in equal portions. Schrodinger felt that the wave mechanics 
that led to this paradox presented an unacceptable description of 
reality. However, Everett, Wheeler and Graham's interpretation of 
quantum mechanics pictures the cats as inhabiting two simultaneous, 
noninteracting, but equally real worlds. 
Later, he and Graham describe Everett’s theory with (DeWitt & Graham 1973): 
 In 1957, in his Princeton doctoral dissertation, Hugh Everett, III,  
proposed a new interpretation of quantum mechanics that denies  
the existence of a separate classical realm and asserts that it makes  
sense to talk about a state vector for the whole universe. This state  
vector never collapses and hence reality as a whole is rigorously  
deterministic. This reality, which is described jointly by the dynamical  
variables and the state vector, is not the reality we customarily think of,  
but is a reality composed of many worlds. By virtue of the temporal  
development of the dynamical variables the state vector decomposes  
naturally into orthogonal vectors, reflecting a continual splitting of the  
universe into a multitude of mutually unobservable but equally real  
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worlds, in each of which every good measurement has yielded a definite  
result and in most of which the familiar statistical quantum laws hold. 
It seems clear that DeWitt and Graham consider that the multitude of branching worlds 
are “real” in the ordinary sense of the word.  In this sense, their Many Worlds perspective 
certainly departs from Everett’s intent. 
 In a 1976 philosophy paper on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, Levy-
Leblond offers critical comments on the many worlds interpretation and compared it to 
his understanding of Everett’s theory.  
Since, with each successive measurement, this state-vector “splits”  
into a superposition of several “branches”, it is said to describe “many  
universes”, one for each of these branches. Where the Copenhagen  
interpretation would arbitrarily choose “one world” by cutting off all  
“branches” of the state-vector except one (presumably the one we think  
we sit upon), one should accept the simultaneous existence of the  
“many worlds” corresponding to all possible outcomes of the measurement.  
Now, my criticism here is exactly symmetrical of the one I directed  
against the orthodox position: the “many worlds” idea again is a left-over  
of classical conceptions. The coexisting branches here, as the unique  
surviving one in the Copenhagen point of view, can only be related to  
“worlds” described by classical physics. The difference is that, instead  
of interpreting the quantum “plus” as a classical “or”, De Witt et al.  
interpret it as a classical “and”. To me, the deep meaning of Everett's  
ideas is not the coexistence of many worlds, but on the contrary, the  
existence of a single quantum one. The main drawback of the “many- 
worlds” terminology is that it leads one to ask the question of “what  
branch we are on”, since it certainly looks as if our consciousness  
definitely belonged to only one world at a time: But this question only  
makes sense from a classical point of view, once more. It becomes  
entirely irrelevant as soon as one commits oneself to a consistent  
quantum view. 
In a letter to Levy-Leblond (Barrett 2011), Everett indicated that he quite agreed with 
Levy-Leblond’s argument and emphasized that the many worlds terminology was not 
his.8  I’m sympathetic with this view.  In fact, I suspect that most of the conundrums and 
paradoxes associated with quantum mechanics arise from trying to impose classical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  However,	  in	  the	  same	  letter	  he	  expressed	  his	  gratitude	  to	  DeWitt:	  “[The]	  Many-­‐Worlds	  Interpretation	  etc.	  ...is	  not	  my	  title	  as	  I	  was	  pleased	  to	  have	  the	  paper	  published	  in	  any	  form	  anyone	  chose	  to	  do	  it	  in!...	  Far	  be	  it	  for	  me	  to	  look	  a	  gift	  Boswellian	  writer	  in	  the	  mouth!”	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views on what are essentially quantum phenomena.9 
 
4.  THE CORRESPONDENCE OF QUANTUM THEORY WITH EXPERIENCE 
 
The first part of Everett’s (long) thesis established the self-consistency of his 
theory of the universal wave function. He then undertakes to address “the question 
whether or not such a theory can be put into correspondence with our experience.”  This 
endeavor is undertaken in a section entitled “OBSERVATION”.  In it, he models a 
measurement as an interaction between the object and observer that results in a 
superposition of entangled object-observer states and then demonstrates that the results of 
a sequence of observations involving one or more observers reproduces the results 
predicted by standard quantum mechanics for almost all observers.10  In the limit of an 
infinite number of observations, the number of observers who find results inconsistent 
with standard quantum mechanics comprise a set of measure zero.  Everett accomplished 
this by introducing “a general scheme for assigning a measure to the elements of a 
superposition of orthogonal states” and concludes “that the only choice of measure 
consistent with our additivity requirement is the square amplitude measure.”11  This was 
the source of his claim that the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics follows 
directly from the formalism, with no need to postulate a “Born rule”.  Everett’s 
conclusion has been criticized by many but, as I mentioned before, it is irrelevant to my 
deliberations and so I won’t comment on it further. 
 What Everett did not do was to indicate how the unitary laws of quantum 
mechanics lead to the branching of observer states that are consistent with what we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I	  made	  this	  point	  in	  a	  similarly	  titled	  paper	  about	  Bell’s	  theorem	  and	  quantum	  non-­‐locality.	  (Boughn	  2017)	  10	  That	  there	  will	  be	  some	  “universes”	  in	  which	  the	  Born	  rule	  is	  invalid	  is	  not	  particularly	  problematic	  just	  as	  within	  standard	  quantum	  mechanics	  there	  is	  a	  finite	  probability	  that	  some	  observers	  will	  find	  the	  results	  of	  a	  set	  of	  measurements	  to	  be	  extremely	  (statistically)	  unlikely.	  11	  Everett	  points	  out	  that	  “The	  situation	  here	  is	  fully	  analogous	  to	  that	  of	  classical	  statistical	  mechanics,	  where	  one	  puts	  a	  [Lebesgue]	  measure	  on	  trajectories	  of	  systems	  in	  the	  phase	  space	  by	  placing	  a	  measure	  on	  the	  phase	  space	  itself.”	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perceive as our “real” world.12  He didn’t seem to be interested in such details.  All he 
endeavored to do was to show that our world was describable in the context of a universal 
wave function.  If so, then his theory was empirically faithful.  As Barrett (2016) put it, 
 So, for Everett, a theory was empirically faithful and hence empirically 
acceptable if there was a homomorphism between its model and the  
world as experienced. What this amounted to here was that pure wave  
mechanics is empirically faithful if one can find observers' experiences 
appropriately associated with modeled observers in the model of the  
theory. In short, Everett took pure wave mechanics to be empirically  
faithful because one could find quantum mechanical experience in the  
model as relative memory records associated with relative modeled  
observers. 
However, Barrett continues, 
 One might, of course, want more than empirical faithfulness from a 
satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics. In keeping with his  
view that pure wave mechanics is quantum mechanics without  
probabilities, Everett simply conceded that every relative state under  
every decomposition of the absolute state in fact obtains. The resulting  
problem, one might feel, is that empirical faithfulness, in Everett's sense  
at least, is a relatively weak form of empirical adequacy. This can be  
seen by considering how one should understand the very notion of  
having a differential expectations when every physically possible  
measurement result is in fact fully realized in the model of the theory…  
That Everett's notion of empirical faithfulness is a relatively weak  
version of empirical adequacy, then, is exhibited in what pure wave  
mechanics, being empirically faithful, does not explain. In particular,  
it does not explain what it is about the physical world that makes it  
appropriate to expect one's relative sequence of records to be typical  
in the normsquared-amplitude sense, or any other sense. In short,  
while one can get subjective expectations for future experience by  
stipulation, the theory itself does not describe a physical world where  
such expectations might be understood as expectations concerning  
what will in fact occur. 
I wonder if Everett would have appreciated the irony of having his theory characterized 
as being “relatively weak” vis-à-vis empirical adequacy after having leveled an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Recall	  my	  exhortation:	  “Another	  problem	  (for	  me)	  is	  how	  are	  we	  ever	  to	  identify	  universes	  like	  ours	  with	  people	  like	  us	  in	  the	  nearly	  googolplex	  of	  universes	  included	  in	  the	  universal	  wave	  function.”	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analogous criticism of Bohr’s interpretation (see Section 2). 
 
5.  EMERGENCE OF THE “CLASSICAL” WORLD 
 
 It is the consensus among physicists today that all forms of matter and radiation, 
including experimental apparatus and observers, are in principle governed by the laws of 
quantum mechanics. Bohr and Heisenberg were certainly comfortable with this view, 
contrary to how some people characterize the Copenhagen interpretation.  (I’ll comment 
more about this in the next section.)  Consequently, there has been considerable effort to 
understand the “classical” world we experience in terms of its quantum mechanical 
description.  Progress has been made in identifying preferred Hilbert space bases that can 
be identified with the world we experience, which would certainly correct one of the 
primary shortcomings of Everett’s thesis and that is how our classical world emerges 
from the universal wave function.  In fact, Everett’s theory served as inspiration for some 
of this work. 
 Perhaps the most successful of these forays has involved the phenomenon of 
decoherence that was advanced by Zeh in the early 1970s and Zurek in the early 1980s.13   
As we described it elsewhere (Boughn & Reginatto 2013) 
Decoherence theory is neither new physics nor a new interpretation 
 of quantum mechanics; although, it is certainly relevant to questions  
of interpretation. In decoherence theory, the measuring apparatus and  
the environment with which it inevitably interacts are both treated as  
purely quantum mechanical systems. As a consequence of the interactions  
of the quantum system of interest with the measuring apparatus and it  
with its immediate environment, the three become entangled, i.e., strongly 
correlated with each other. All, or at least most, of the environmental  
quantum degrees of freedom are not observable (certainly, not observed)  
and, therefore, must be summed over to achieve a reduced state of the  
system plus apparatus. The net effect of the enormous number of  
environmental degrees of freedom is that off-diagonal terms of the  
reduced density matrix rapidly vanish, i.e., coherence between the  
different eigenstates of the system/apparatus is lost. Thus, decoherence  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Zurek	  credits	  Everett	  for	  inspiring	  him	  to	  pursue	  this	  phenomenon.	  (Byrne	  2010,	  p.	  366)	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theory demonstrates why it is that quantum coherence is seldom, if ever,  
observed at the classical (macroscopic) level. 
 While much of the work on decoherence has not been directly related to the 
“many worlds” aspect of Everett’s thesis, it is directly related to the notion of a universal 
wave function in the context of cosmology.  For example, Gell-Mann and Hartle (1990) 
were motivated by developing “a quantum-mechanical framework for the universe as a 
whole…for describing the ultimate origin in quantum cosmology of the ‘quasiclassical 
domain’ of familiar experience and for characterizing the process of measurement.”  The 
decoherence histories approach that they promote involves the course graining of 
decoherent trajectories in Hilbert space together with a probability measure for these 
trajectories.  In addition, it is possible for some course grained “universes” to have 
consistent histories over time in just the way we see our universe as normally evolving.  
Therefore, the decoherent histories formalism alleviates both my discomfort with there 
being a huge number of copies of myself with virtually identical experiences and my 
childhood fear of ceasing to exist every night when I fell asleep (or more drastically at 
every time step of the universal wave function).   While many such analyses do not 
directly reference the “many worlds” concept, like Everett’s, their purpose was to 
develop an approach that “does not depend on an assumed separation of classical and 
quantum domains, on notions of measurement, or on collapse of the wave function.” 
(Halliwell 1995).   
 While I find these sorts of analyses interesting, even compelling, I long ago came 
to doubt that there was any need to resolve the quantum/classical dilemma.  For me, 
Schrodinger’s cat poses no paradox.  I certainly assumed that the cat could be treated 
quantum mechanically, in which case the quantum state would consist of the 
superposition of a live and dead cat.  Like Everett, I also assumed that, in principle, one 
could perform an experiment that would reveal the presence of both the live and dead 
states.  On the other hand, the difficulty of performing such an experiment would render 
bringing the dead back to life trivial by comparison.  Also, the sorts of analyses referred 
to above deal only in generalities.  They don’t even approach specifying a detailed 
macroscopic quantum state or an associated Hamiltonian.  Finally, even if I were to find 
the arguments compelling, I would characterize them as simply demonstrating the 
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consistency of the quantum mechanical microscopic world with the classical macroscopic 
world rather than demonstrating how classical physics emerges from quantum mechanics.  
I suppose this isn’t a very important distinction.  In any case, many worlds or not, I will 
level some criticism of these cosmological considerations in the next section. 
 
6.  CHALLENGING MANY WORLDS 
 
 From my point of view, there are four problems of “conventional” quantum 
mechanics that Everett chose to confront in his thesis: 1) the non-unitary collapse of the 
wave function; 2) the Copenhagen interpretation’s reliance on the classical description of 
measurements; 3) the probabilistic assumption (Born rule) that was necessary to interpret 
quantum formalism; and 4) the problem of “quantizing general relativity” and the 
“serious questions about the meaning of the [then] present formulation and interpretation 
of quantum mechanics when applied to so fundamental a structure as the space-time 
geometry itself” (Everett 1957)14.  Everett felt he successfully addressed problem 3) by 
demonstrating that the probabilistic assertions of quantum mechanics were subjective 
appearances of observers that follow directly from the quantum formalism.  As I 
mentioned before, this conclusion has been widely criticized as well as expanded upon by 
others and I won’t elaborate on it.  From my pragmatic perspective, the Born rule is just 
fine. 
 Everett’s vehicle for confronting all these problems is “the universal wave 
function” so it is here that I’ll begin my challenge.  As I mentioned before, he didn’t 
seem particularly interested in discussing the “reality” of what DeWitt referred to as the 
myriad of branches of the universe.  For Everett, these branches were peripheral to his 
contention that “the physical ‘reality’ is assumed to be the wave function of the whole  
universe itself.” (Bryne 2010, p. 140) Even though these were Everett’s words, it is not 
entirely clear just what he meant by “reality”.  Perhaps it’s telling that in both the long 
and short versions of his thesis the words “real” and “reality” only appear within 
quotation marks.  Maybe he was trying to tell us that he didn’t mean the sort of ontic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Recall	  that	  the	  latter	  problem	  did	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  preliminary,	  long	  version	  of	  Everett’s	  thesis	  but,	  presumably	  at	  Wheeler’s	  request,	  the	  final	  short	  version	  began	  by	  emphasizing	  it.	  	  This	  problem	  is	  considered	  by	  many	  to	  be	  of	  paramount	  importance	  to	  quantum	  cosmology.	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reality that we (and DeWitt) all know and love. Another indication of Everett’s take on 
realism appeared in the second appendix to the preliminary, long version of his thesis.  
The title of the appendix was “Remarks on the Role of Theoretical Physics” and in it he 
notes: 
The essential point of a theory, then, is that it is a mathematical model… 
However, when a theory is highly successful and becomes firmly  
established, the model tends to become identified with “reality” itself,  
and the model nature of the theory becomes obscured. The rise of  
classical physics offers an excellent example of this process. The  
constructs of classical physics are just as much fictions of our own  
minds as those of any other theory we simply have a great deal more  
confidence in them. It must be deemed a mistake, therefore, to attribute  
any more “reality” here than elsewhere… Once we have granted that  
any physical theory is essentially only a model for the world of experience,  
we must renounce all hope of finding anything like “the correct theory.” 
Everett seems to be telling us that the notion of a universal wave function is actually just 
a “fiction of our own minds”.   According to Barrett (2016), Everett was “an operational 
realist”, 
Rather than take the branches determined by a physically preferred basis  
or those determined by, or roughly determined by, some decoherence  
condition to determine which physically possible worlds were real, he  
took every branch in any basis to have observational consequences and  
hence to be real in his operational sense. Given how he understood  
branches and their role in determining the empirical faithfulness of the  
theory, Everett never had to say anything concerning how a particular  
physically preferred basis is selected because none was required. 
Nevertheless, much of the discussion of the interpretation of quantum mechanical wave 
functions, especially in the philosophical literature has focused on their ontological 
nature.   
 In order to comprehend the wave function of the universe, it necessary to address 
the question of what we mean by the term “wave function”.  By “mean” I’m referring to 
the empirical meaning that any experimentalist like me needs to know.  It is here that 
Stapp’s 1972 paper on the Copenhagen interpretation informs us.  In Stapp’s practical 
account of quantum theory, a system to be measured is first prepared according to a set of 
specifications, A, which are then transcribed into a wave function Ψ!(𝑥), where x are the 
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degrees of freedom of the system.  The specifications A are “couched in a language that is 
meaningful to an engineer or laboratory technician”, i.e., not in the language of quantum 
(or even classical) formalism.  Likewise, B are a set of specifications of the subsequent 
measurement and its possible results.  These are transcribed into another wave function Ψ!(𝑦), where y are the degrees of freedom of the measured system.  How are the 
mappings of A and B to Ψ!(𝑥) and Ψ!(𝑦) effected?  According to Stapp, 
 …no one has yet made a qualitatively accurate theoretical description  
 of a measuring device.  Thus what experimentalists do, in practice,  
is to calibrate their devices…[then] with plausible assumptions…it  
is possible to build up a catalog of correspondences between what 
experimentalists do and see, and the wave functions of the prepared 
and measured systems.  It is this body of accumulated empirical 
knowledge that bridges the gap between the operational specifications 
A and B and their mathematical images Ψ! and Ψ!.  Next a transition  
function 𝑈(𝑥;𝑦) is constructed in accordance with certain theoretical  
rules…the ‘transition amplitude’ 𝐴 𝐵 ≡ Ψ! 𝑥 𝑈 𝑥;𝑦 Ψ!∗   𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦  
is computed.  The predicted probability that a measurement performed  
in the manner specified by B will yield a result specified by B, if the  
preparation is performed in the manner specified by A, is given by  𝑃 𝐴,𝐵 = 𝐴 𝐵 !. 
Of course, our use of quantum wave functions is not limited to the experimentalist’s 
laboratory.  One often assigns a wave function to systems and measurements that have 
been prepared naturally.  Consider, for example, the case of the emission of 21 cm 
radiation from hydrogen in the interstellar medium.  In that case one specifies the intial 
upper ground state wave function, the subsequent lower ground state wave function, and 
the interaction that results in the emission of radiation. In this case, the interstellar 
environment takes the place of the experimentalist’s laboratory.  Nevertheless, the 
conditions of this environment provide the operational specifications that the astronomer 
must translate into wave functions.  Also, it is unlikely that such translations could ever 
be made without the laboratory experiments that informed us about quantum 
phenomenon. 
 What’s my point here?  It is that the quantum mechanical wave function is a 
theoretical construct that we invented to deal with our observations of physical 
phenomena.  As such, it seems reasonable that we derive our understanding of it 
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according to how we use the concept.  So, in what sense is it reasonable to talk about the 
wave function of the entire universe?  Stapp’s (and Bohr’s) pragmatic account of wave 
functions is intimately tied to state preparation and measurement, both of which are 
described in terms of operational specifications that lie wholly outside the formalism of 
quantum mechanics.  Prior to the preparation of a system the wave function is not even 
defined and after it has been measured the wave function ceases to have a referent.  To 
extrapolate the notion of the wave function to the entire universe is an enormous leap that 
necessitates dropping all references to the operational specifications that gave wave 
functions their meanings in the first place.  One might be led to such an extrapolation by 
ascribing an ontic reality to the notion of wave function (despite its epistemic transitory 
nature).  This is especially tempting when presented with some of the incredible 
successes of quantum theory.  I was certainly enticed to do so when I first learned of the 
twelve decimal place agreement of the quantum electrodynamic prediction with the 
measured value of the g-factor of the electron.15  It’s interesting that this is precisely what 
Everett cautioned us against in the appendix to the long version of his thesis, and yet he 
still embraced the notion of a universal wave function. To accept the notion of a universal 
wave function requires a careful treatment of the meaning of the concept.  Simply 
transferring the construct from its pragmatic atomic physics origins is, for me, not good 
enough.  Now to the specific problems that Everett confronted. 
 On the very first page of the preliminary version of his thesis Everett presents 
what he terms as “the most common form [of quantum mechanics] encountered in 
textbooks and university lectures on the subject” and identifies the problem of “The 
discontinuous change brought about by the observation”, i.e., the collapse of the wave 
function.  As I’ve already mentioned, wave function collapse wasn’t a concept that I 
encountered in my introductory quantum mechanics courses.  So just how did this 
concept enter the quantum lexicon?  Some credit (blame?) Heisenberg from comments in 
his seminal paper on the uncertainty principle (Heisenberg 1927).  I can find only two 
relevant comments. He notes that as a consequence of observing an atomic system “we 
will find the atom has jumped from the nth [superposition] state to the mth state with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  When	  I	  was	  a	  graduate	  student	  it	  was	  considered	  prescient	  that	  the	  acronym	  for	  quantum	  electrodynamics	  (QED)	  was	  the	  same	  as	  for	  the	  Latin	  phrase	  quod	  erat	  demonstrandum.	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probability…” and in a discussion of an electron wave packet he comments, “Thus every 
position determination reduces [my italics] the wavepacket…”  Perhaps, the first careful 
discussion of wave function reduction appeared in von Neumann’s 1932 revolutionary 
text The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (von Neumann 1955) in 
which he gave a quantum mechanical description of measurements.  He specified two 
processes in quantum mechanics: the discontinuous change of states that occurs as a 
result of a measurement; and the unitary evolution of quantum states (e.g., the 
Schrödinger equation).  In 1935, Dirac was more explicit in his equally revered text, The 
Principles of Quantum Mechanics, (Myrvold 2017) 
When we measure a real dynamical variable 𝜉, the disturbance  
involved in the act of measurement causes a jump in the state of the  
dynamical system. From physical continuity, if we make a second  
measurement of the same dynamical variable 𝜉 immediately after the  
first, the result of the second measurement must be the same as that of  
the first. Thus after the first measurement has been made, there is no 
indeterminacy in the result of the second. Hence, after the first measurement  
has been made, the system is in an eigenstate of the dynamical variable 𝜉, 
the eigenvalue it belongs to being equal to the result of the first measurement. 
This conclusion must still hold if the second measurement is not actually  
made. In this way we see that a measurement always causes the system to  
jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured,  
the eigenvalue this eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result.  
This seems like a reasonable conclusion; so what is my problem with it?  For one thing, 
measurements rarely proceed in such a fashion.  After a measurement, the object that was 
given a wave function description is usually nowhere to be found.  Even a relatively 
simple experiment as provided by a Stern-Gerlach apparatus usually ends with a 
polarized atom striking a photographic emulsion (or the modern equivalent) after which 
there is no conceivable way to measure its state again.  To be sure, in special cases the 
quantum system can be measured to be in a particular eigenstate and afterwards can be 
found in that same state.  In those cases it seems as if the wave function might actually 
have collapsed.   
Recall that Everett maintained such a discontinuous transition never occurs.  His 
universal wave function continues evolving according to the Schrödinger equation.  The 
apparent collapse is simply in the mind of a particular state of the observer.  DeWitt 
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might replace “particular state of the observer” with “particular observer” with the 
implication that there are many such observers (many worlds).  Bohr would agree that 
there is no such thing as the collapse of the wave function.  So how did he explain the 
“apparent” collapse of the wave function?  The Copenhagen interpretation’s resolution of 
the problem (according to Stapp 1972) is as straightforward as Everett’s.  In the case that 
the quantum system is disrupted upon the completion of a measurement, the pre-
measurement wave function simply ceases to have meaning and there is nothing that 
requires the notion of wave function collapse.  In the special cases mentioned above, the 
measurement does not disrupt the quantum system but leaves it in a state with a well-
defined wave function that can be used to predict a subsequent measurement.  This is the 
only time that the notion of wave function collapse might make sense.  However, in this 
case, the Copenhagen interpretation would simply point out that the original 
specifications of the quantum system must be replaced by new ones that include the 
specifications of the results of the measurement.  “Then the original wave function will 
be naturally replaced by a new one, just as it would be in classical statistical theory.” 
(Stapp 1972)  Some physicists prefer to claim, euphemistically, that wave function 
collapse happens in the mind of the observer but not for any physical reason.  For 
example Hartle, who took Everett’s ideas seriously, noted (Hartle 1968) 
The “reduction of the wave packet” does take place in the consciousness 
of the observer, not because of any unique physical process which takes 
place there, but only because the state is a construct of the observer and 
not an objective property of the physical system. 
The second problem with conventional quantum mechanics that Everett sought to 
solve was the Copenhagen’s interpretations requirement that the act of measurement or 
observation must be described in terms of classical physics.  As Everett (1956) put it, 
Another objectionable feature [in addition to its “extreme conservatism”  
referred to in Section 2] of this position is its strong reliance upon the  
classical level from the outset, which precludes any possibility of explaining  
this level on the basis of an underlying quantum theory. (The deduction of  
classical phenomena from quantum theory is impossible simply because  
no meaningful statements can be made without pre-existing classical  
apparatus to serve as a reference frame.) This interpretation suffers from  
the dualism of adhering to a “reality” concept (i.e., the possibility of  
objective description) on the classical level but renouncing the same in  
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the quantum domain.  
Many others have worried about the quantum/classical divide and it is usually 
considered to be one of the major conundrums of the measurement problem in quantum 
mechanics. The dilemma is predicated upon the supposition that experiments must be, or 
inevitably are, described by classical physics.  So why didn’t Bohr seem to worry about 
the unseemly merger of classical and quantum formalism?  I suspect that the answer is 
because he didn’t actually consider that any such merger is required.  While Bohr 
endeavored to be extremely careful in expressing his ideas, his prose is often obscure.  
However, consider his following brief description of a measurement (Bohr 1963, p. 3): 
The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the experimental 
arrangement and the recordings of observations must be given in plain  
language, suitably refined by the usual terminology. This is a simple  
logical demand, since by the word ‘experiment’ we can only mean a  
procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others what  
we have done and what we have learnt. 
Nowhere in this description does he refer to classical physics.  Stapp (1972) chose to 
emphasize this pragmatic view by using the word specifications , i.e., 
Specifcations are what architects and builders, and mechanics and  
machinists, use to communicate to one another conditions on the concrete  
social realities or actualities that bind their lives together. It is hard to think  
of a theoretical concept that could have a more objective meaning.  
Specifications are described in technical jargon that is an extension of  
everyday language. This language may incorporate concepts from classical 
physics. But this fact in no way implies that these concepts are valid  
beyond the realm in which they are used by technicians. 
The point is that descriptions of experiments are invariably given in terms of operational 
prescriptions or specifications that can be communicated to the technicians, engineers, 
and the physics community at large. Are these operational prescriptions part and parcel of 
classical theory? Are they couched in terms of point particles, rigid solid bodies, 
Newton's laws or Hamilton-Jacobi theory?  Of course not. They are part of Bohr's 
“procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others what we 
have done and what we have learnt.”  Camilleri and Schlosshauer (2015) point out, 
“Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts is not primarily an interpretation of quantum 
mechanics (although it certainly bears on it), but rather is an attempt by Bohr to elaborate 
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an epistemology of experiment.”  So it seems to me that Everett’s (and others’) assertion 
that Bohr insisted on merging a quantum system with a classical measuring apparatus is a 
“straw man” that has little to do with Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics.  In 
fact, one can find several passages in Bohr’s writings where he claims that the physics of 
experimental apparatus is certainly describable by the formalism of quantum mechanics 
(Bohr 2010, Camilleri & Schlosshauer 2015).  But that description has little to do with 
the “epistemology of experiment”.  
 In some sense, classical physics has precisely the same problem in that 
experiments are not described by the formalism of the theory but by the same operational 
specifications to which Stapp refers. (Boughn and Reginatto 2018a)  This point has 
certainly not gone unnoticed by those trying to come to grips with the quantum/classical 
divide. At a 1962 conference on the foundations of quantum mechanics, Wendell Furry 
explained [Furry 1962]   
So that in quantum theory we have something not really worse than  
we had in classical theory. In both theories you don't say what you do  
when you make a measurement, what the process is. But in quantum  
theory we have our attention focused on this situation. And we do  
become uncomfortable about it, because we have to talk about the effects  
of the measurement on the systems....I am asking for something that the 
formalism doesn't contain, finally when you describe a measurement. Now, 
classical theory doesn't contain any description of measurement. It doesn't  
contain anywhere near as much theory of measurement as we have here  
[in quantum mechanics]. There is a gap in the quantum mechanical theory  
of measurement. In classical theory there is practically no theory of  
measurement at all, as far as I know. 
At that same conference Eugene Wigner put it like this [Wigner 1962] 
Now, how does the experimentalist know that this apparatus will measure  
for him the position? “Oh”, you say, “he observed that apparatus. He looked  
at it.”  Well that means that he carried out a measurement on it. How did he  
know that the apparatus with which he carried out that measurement will tell  
him the properties of the apparatus? Fundamentally, this is again a chain  
which has no beginning. And at the end we have to say, “We learned that as 
children how to judge what is around us.” And there is no way to do this 
scientifically. The fact that in quantum mechanics we try to analyze the 
measurement process only brought this home to us that much sharply. 
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Because physicists have long since become comfortable with the relation between 
theory and measurement in classical physics, perhaps the quantum case shouldn't be 
viewed as particularly problematic, in which case Everett’s universal wave function has 
nothing to offer on this point. 
 Finally, let me say a few words on the necessity of a universal wave function in 
the treatment of quantum cosmology.  Because I have little knowledge of this topic, I’ll 
have much less to say. The connection of Everett’s interpretation and quantum 
cosmology is clear.  A quantum cosmological model of the universe clearly requires a 
universal wave function.  As Everett noted in the short, final version of his thesis:  
How is one to apply the conventional formulation of quantum mechanics 
 to the space-time geometry itself? The issue becomes especially acute  
in the case of a closed universe. There is no place to stand outside the  
system to observe it. There is nothing outside it to produce transitions  
from one state to another.   
Here again is the reference to the “classical” observer that the Cophenhagen 
interpretation considers to be external to the system.  The implication is that any observer 
must be included in the universal wave function just as Everett’s theory demands. 
Wheeler (1957) made a similar point in his commentary of Everett’s thesis and since then 
many physicists with an interest in quantum cosmology have made the point that a closed 
system like the universe is incompatible with the notion of an external observer.16  Some, 
but not all, of these reference Everett’s thesis. I don’t find this sort of argument at all 
convincing.  I suspect that it, in part, arises from the mistaken characterization of Bohr’s 
observer and measurement apparatus as elements of classical theory.  As I (and Stapp) 
argued above, the operational specifications describing observations are external to the 
formalism of any theory, including quantum and classical mechanics.  Everett seems to 
acknowledge this in the aforementioned second appendix to his long thesis.  In it he 
explains 
Every theory can be divided into two separate parts, the formal part,  
and the interpretive part. The formal part consists of a purely logico- 
mathematical structure, i.e., a collection of symbols together with rules  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Here	  is	  a	  sample	  of	  work	  that	  have	  made	  similar	  points:	  Aguirre	  &	  Tegmark	  2011;	  Bousso	  &	  Suskind	  2012;	  Castagnino,	  et.	  al	  2017;	  Gell-­‐Mann	  &	  Hartle	  1990:	  Halliwell	  1995;	  Hartle	  &	  Hawking	  1983;	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for their manipulation, while the interpretive part consists of a set of 
“associations,” which are rules which put some of the elements of the  
formal part into correspondence with the perceived world. The essential  
point of a theory, then, is that it is a mathematical model, together with  
an isomorphism between the model and the world of experience (i.e.,  
the sense perceptions of the individual, or the “real world” – depending  
upon one’s choice of epistemology). 
What Everett (and others) fail to understand is that Bohr’s description of observers and 
experiments is in terms of the world of experience (sense perceptions) and not in terms of 
the formalism of classical physics.  It seems to me that this is true of the descriptions of 
observations in any field of science. 
 Of course, one might insist that the theory of the entire universe is different than 
other theories and needs no “correspondence with the perceived world”.  This is hard for 
me to swallow.  Cosmological theories are still models and are certainly distinct from us 
and our perceptions of the world.  On the other hand, I have no problem with postulating 
a wave function of the early universe that might help us comprehend cosmology.  But we 
must be very clear how we propose to use such a wave function and especially how we 
can find experimental/observational corroboration of the theory.  Such a quantum 
cosmological wave function might be very similar to our current understanding of 
quantum states or it might not be.  Finally, classical cosmology has provided a very 
successful description of the large-scale structure of the universe without ever worrying 
that observers aren’t included in that formalism. 
 
7.  FINAL REMARKS AND A CONFESSION 
 
 Let me begin with the confession.  When I decided to learn more about the many 
worlds interpretation I had already assumed I would conclude that it was a silly notion.  
After reading the long and short versions of Everett’s thesis several times, I decided that 
his theory wasn’t as silly as I had imagined.  In fact, if I had to choose between Everett’s 
interpretation with its universal wave function and interpretations involving the collapse 
of the wave function, I would go with Everett’s.  This is especially so because of his 
reluctance to ascribe to DeWitt’s parallel universes.  He simply postulated a universal 
wave function to be operationally real and stopped there.  Of course, for reasons 
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discussed above I find the idea of a universal wave function neither well defined nor 
necessarily useful. 
 I’ve endeavored to make a distinction between Everett’s universal wave function 
and DeWitt’s many worlds interpretation of Everett’s work.  For Everett, there is one, 
quantum universe that is characterized by a universal wave function while for DeWitt 
there are a “myriad of copies” of the universe.  Today the term multiverse is more 
common than many worlds.  I find it somewhat amusing that the 19th century American 
philosopher William James first used this term in an analogous discussion of the 
universe.  I’ve referred to Bohr’s (and my) pragmatic view of quantum mechanics.  Well, 
James was one of the founders of philosophic pragmatism (also called radical 
empiricism).  In 1908 he delivered a series of eight Hibbert lectures at Manchester 
College, Oxford, entitled A Pluralistic Universe.  Near the end of the second lecture he 
characterizes the rationalist (monistic idealist) contention that one must choose between a 
pure (singular) universe and a pure (disconnected) multiverse.  According to the 
rationalist there is no alternative.  This distinction strikes me as precisely the difference 
between Everett’s pure (singular) quantum universe characterized by a universal wave 
function and DeWitt’s (disconnected) multiverse.  I suspect that for them, there is no 
alternative to these two interpretations.  James, the pragmatist, refused to choose between 
the two.  For him and Bohr (and me), a pluralistic view of the universe is preferable.17 
 Even though Bohr dismissed Everett’s interpretation and Everett clearly didn’t 
think highly of the Copenhagen interpretation, the two certainly had something in 
common.  Neither considered wave function collapse to be viable or even necessary.  
Also, they both were keenly aware that quantum mechanics was a mathematical model 
that needed to be put into correspondence with the perceived world.  The problem was 
that Everett seemed not to understand that Bohr considered experiments as part of the 
perceived world of experience and, therefore, quite distinct from the theoretical model.  
Everett (and many others) interpreted Bohr’s statements about classical experiments as a 
requirement that classical physics must be included in the formalism of quantum 
mechanics.  Had Bohr been more kind, he might have explained to Everett the fallacy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	  fact,	  Stapp’s	  (1972)	  correspondence	  with	  Heisenberg	  included	  a	  discussion	  of	  Bohr’s	  favorable	  disposition	  towards	  James’s	  philosophy.	  
	   30	  
this position.  Maybe he did try.  For his part, Everett seemed equally dismissive of the 
Copenhagen interpretation, which he termed “a	  sterile	  occupation”.  Maybe he should 
have put more effort in figuring out what Bohr actually meant (even though this is no 
simple task). 
 Perhaps because of Bohr’s negative impression of Everett’s theory, some have 
argued that his universal wave function was given short shrift and, for that reason, Everett 
was pushed out of academia.  Cosmologist Max Tegmark, a strong supporter of Everett’s 
interpretation, noted in a paper with Wheeler (Tegmark & Wheeler 2001), “Everett’s 
work was largely disregarded for about two decades.”  In another paper (Tegmark 2007) 
he opined, “Everett’s discovery…took over a decade until it started getting noticed. But it 
was too late for Everett who left academia disillusioned.”  My impression is somewhat 
different and so I would like to push back a bit against this conclusion.  As for Everett 
leaving academia disillusioned, I point out that in September 1956, six months before 
submitting his thesis, he left Princeton to take a job in the Pentagon's newly formed 
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, a job which he seemed to quite relish (Byrne 2010).  
To be sure, in 1959 at Wheeler’s request he visited Bohr in Copenhagen with “disastrous 
results” but as far as I can ascertain he had no intensions of leaving his Washington job.  
As for his work not being noticed, this also seems to be an overstatement.  In 1957 at the 
Chapel Hill Conference on the Role of Gravitation in Physics 9 (at which he was not in 
attendance), Everett’s ideas were included in the discussion.  Even Feyman, who attended 
the conference, offered critical remarks on “the concept of a ‘universal wave function’.” 
(Osnaghi et al. 2009)  It was in the Reviews of Modern Physics collection of papers from 
this conference that the published version of Everett’s thesis appeared.  According to 
Osnaghi et al. (2009), 
 These were certainly not the optimum publishing conditions for  
Everett’s work to receive the wider recognition that Wheeler had  
originally hoped for.  Pre-prints were nonetheless sent to many  
distinguished physicists, including Schrödinger, van Hove, Oppenheimer,  
Dyson, Yang, Wiener, Wightman, Wigner, and Margenau, besides  
of course Bohr and his collaborators.  The responses of DeWitt, Wiener 
and Margenau were quite favorable.  
“Optimum” or not, such an introduction to Everett’s work seems to me to be quite 
remarkable.  Five years later, Everett was invited to discuss his ideas at a 1962 
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conference at Xavier University. This was a small 5-day conference on the foundations of 
quantum mechanics with a very limited audience.  There were only 6 main participants, 
Yakir Aharonov, P. A. M. Dirac, Wendell Furry, Boris Podolsky, Nathan Rosen, and 
Eugene Wigner plus a limited audience of 15 other prominent physicists and 
philosophers.18  On the first day of the conference in the middle of a discussion of wave 
function collapse, Podolsky asked Rosen if he would say something about Everett’s 
ideas.  There followed a brief discussion during which it was suggested that Everett fly 
from Washington (to Cincinnati) to discuss his ideas in person.  This happened on the 
following day and a lively discussion ensued.  If 5 years after receiving my PhD I had 
been summoned to appear before such an august panel, it would have been one of the 
highlights of my career.  Evidently, most of these prominent physicists did disregard 
Everett’s interpretation, as Tegmark noted, but it seems clear that his ideas did receive a 
fair hearing. 
It should be clear that from my pragmatic, experimentalist point of view, I am 
much more confortable with Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation than I am with Everett’s 
universal wave function.  For me, Everett’s interpretation adds little to my understanding 
of quantum mechanics and cosmology.  This is not to say that one should not attempt to 
make use of a quantum mechanical model to help us understand the early universe.  
Whether or not this makes use of a “universal wave function” remains to be seen.  
However, to simply transplant the wave function and Schrödinger equation from atomic 
physics and apply it to the entire universe is not well motivated.  If one rejects the notion 
that the wave function has an ontic reality, as do I, then at the very least one should 
clearly specify the empirical meaning of the universal wave function, i.e., how it is used 
in conjunction with observations, before employing it in this context.  Also, as discussed 
above, I see no reason why observers should be included in such a wave function.  It 
seems to me that it is neither necessary nor useful to do so. To be clear, I am not 
suggesting that quantum phenomena are absent in the early universe but rather that one 
might have to modify our current formalism to include them.  For me, it is the empirical 
concept of the quantum of action (ℎ) that is the key construct of quantum mechanics, not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  This	  was	  the	  same	  conference	  from	  which	  I	  took	  Furry’s	  and	  Wigner’s	  above	  quoted	  remarks.	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the wave function or Hilbert state vector (Boughn 2018)19, and it seems likely that this 
should be the starting point for any extension of the domain of quantum theory. When 
Wheeler’s support for Everett’s interpretation began to wane, he specifically mentioned 
the importance of the quantum (of action) that he felt Everett had neglected.  In 1979 he 
proclaimed (Byrne 2010, p. 332)   
 Imaginative Everett’s thesis is, and instructive, we agree.  We once 
 subscribed to it.  In retrospect, however, it looks like the wrong track. 
 First, this formulation of quantum mechanics denigrates the quantum. 
 It denies from the start that the quantum character of Nature is any clue 
 to the plan of physics.  Take this Hamiltonian for the world, that  
 Hamiltonian, or any other Hamiltonian, this formulation says.  I am in 
 principle too lordly to care which, or why there should be any Hamiltonian 
 at all.  You give me whatever world you please, and in return I give you 
 back many worlds.  Don’t look to me for help in understanding this 
 universe. 
Anton Zeilinger (1996), who suggested “that the austerity of the Copenhagen 
interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding [of 
quantum mechanics]”, also points to the importance of the quantum of action in any new 
formulation:   
If…we accept that there might be a problem of proper philosophical  
foundation in quantum mechanics, the question arises as to what the  
new paradigm should look like, what its features should be. Here, it is  
certainly helpful to investigate which features differentiate the new  
theory from the old one. Of course, the quantum of action is the first to  
catch the eye, especially the fact that there is a universal smallest action  
which can be exchanged in a physical process. I propose that this fact,  
which originates from experiment and which is integrated in theory,  
should actually follow from the new paradigm. 
Finally, while it’s clear that I don’t agree with Everett’s interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, many physicists have maintained that his thesis has provided inspiration in 
the pursuit of new areas of research in physics. Many of these instances are discussed in 
Byrne’s 2010 book.  According to Byrne, Dieter Zeh, Wojciech Zurek, Erich Joos, 
Murray Gell-Mann, Stephen Hawking, and James Hartle all credit Everett with inspiring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  derive	  the	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indeterminacy relation, 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝~ℎ. (Hall & Reginatto 2002, Boughn & Reginatto 2018b)	  
	   33	  
them to think beyond the limitations on understanding imposed by the Copenhagen 
interpretation and the collapse postulate.  Zeh, Zurek, and Joos were the prime movers 
behind decoherence theory, an important step in solving the preferred basis problem.  
David Deutsch, a pioneer in the field of quantum information and quantum computing, 
met Everett when he was a graduate student of Wheeler’s at the University of Texas, a 
meeting from which he found inspiration.  At the 1989 Santa Fe conference, Complexity, 
Entropy, and the Physics of Information, “Everett was widely credited as bringing 
information theory to bear on quantum mechanics.” (Byrne 2010, pp. 370-2)  At the same 
meeting Hartle and Gell-Mann credited Everett with suggesting how to apply quantum 
mechanics to cosmology.  “They considered their ‘decohering sets of histories’ theory as 
an ‘extension’ of his work.” Another conference participant, Jonathan Helliwell, 
“…explained that cosmologists owe Everett a debt for opening the door to a completely 
quantum universe.”  So whether one considers Everett’s interpretation as being an 
insightful extension of quantum mechanics or a misguided attempt to solve non-existent 
problems (wave function collapse and the classicality of measurements), as I do, there 
can be no doubt that Everett’s theory has inspired others who have made important 
contributions to physics (and philosophy). 
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